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Abstract
This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and
a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences. We impose consistency restrictions
directly on the intertemporal tradeos by relying on what we call `annuity compensations'.
Our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting
from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In a pilot experiment we use the partial
identication approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the
subject pool. Consistent with previous studies, we nd evidence for both present and future
bias. (JEL codes: C10, C99, D03, D90)
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Understanding how agents trade o costs and benets that occur at dierent periods of
time is a fundamental issue in economics. The leading paradigm used for the analysis
of intertemporal choice has been the exponential (or geometric) discounting model
introduced by Samuelson (1937) and characterized axiomatically by Koopmans (1960).
The two main properties of this utility representation are time separability and
stationarity. Time separability means that the marginal rate of substitution between
any two time periods is independent of the consumption levels in other periods, which
rules out habit formation and related phenomena. Stationarity means that the marginal
rate of substitution between any two consecutive periods is the same.
The present bias is a well-documented failure of stationarity where the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption in periods 0 and 1, is smaller than the marginal
rate of substitution between periods 1 and 2. For example, the following preference
pattern is indicative of present bias.
(1;0;0;0;:::)  (0;2;0;0;:::) (1a)
and
(0;1;0;0;0;:::)  (0;0;2;0;0;:::); (1b)
where both symbols  and  refer to the preference over consumption streams ex-
pressed at the beginning of time before receiving any payos.
This paper is concerned with a very widely applied model of present bias, the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, which was rst applied to study individual choice
by Laibson (1997).1 A consumption stream (x0;x1;x2;:::) is evaluated by
V (x0;x1;x2;:::) = u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

t 1u(xt);
1This formalism was originally proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study inter-generational
discounting. See also Zeckhauser and Fels (1968), published as Fels and Zeckhauser (2008).
2where u is the ow utility function,  2 (0;1) is the long-run discount factor, and
 2 (0;1] is the short-run discount factor that captures the strength of the present
bias;  = 1 corresponds to the standard discounted utility model.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting retains the property of time-separability but relaxes
stationarity. However, the departure from stationarity is minimal: stationarity is satis-
ed from period t = 1 onward; this property is referred to as quasi-stationarity. Further
relaxations of stationarity have been proposed, for instance the generalized hyperbolic
discounting of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).2 Our approach is not directly applicable
to those models; however, both our axiomatization and experimental design extend to a
class of semi-hyperbolic preferences, which approximates any time separable preference.
Present bias may lead to violations of dynamic consistency when choices at later
points in time are also part of the analysis; this has led to many dierent ways of mod-
eling dynamic choice3. Since our results uncover the shape of \time zero" preferences
without taking a stance on how they change, they can inform any of these models.
1.1 Axiomatic characterization
The customary method of measuring the strength of the present bias focuses directly
on the tradeo between consumption levels in periods 0 and 1, see, e.g., Thaler (1981).
The value of  can be revealed by varying consumption in period 1 to obtain in-
dierence to a xed level of consumption in time 0. However, this inference relies on
parametric assumptions about the utility function u and is subject to many experimen-
tal confounds, see, e.g., McClure et al. (2007), Chabris et al. (2008), and Noor (2009,
2011) among others. Hayashi (2003) and Andersen et al. (2008) employ a conceptu-
ally related method that uses probability mixtures to elicit the tradeos. However,
2Experimental studies (see, e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Van der Pol and Cairns, 2011) nd that
generalized hyperbolic discounting ts the data better than the quasi-hyperbolic model. However,
quasi-hyperbolic discounting is being used in many economic models, as quasi-stationarity greatly
simplies the analysis.
3For example, sophistication and naivety (Strotz, 1955), partial sophistication (O'Donoghue and
Rabin, 2001), costly self-control and dual-self models (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Gul and Pesendorfer,
2001, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006).
3this method relies on the expected utility assumption and in addition the assumption
that risk aversion is inversely proportional to the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution (EIS). The method that our axiomatization is building on uses only two xed
consumption levels, but instead varies the time horizon.4 In the quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting model the subjective distance between periods 0 and 1 (measured by ) is
larger than the subjective distance between periods 1 and 2 (measured by ), which is
the reason behind the preference pattern (1a){(1b). We uncover the parameter  by
increasing the second distance enough to make it subjectively equal to the former. The
delay needed to exactly match the two distances is directly related to the value of .
For example, if  = , then the gap between periods 0 and 1 () is equal to the gap
between periods 1 and 3 (2). In this case, the following preference pattern obtains:
(x;y;0;0;:::)  (z;w;0;0;:::) (2a)
if and only if
(0;x;0;y;0;0;:::)  (0;z;0;w;0;0;:::): (2b)
Since we are working in discrete time, for certain values of  there may not exist a
corresponding delay that would provide an exact compensation. However it is always
possible to compensate the agent with an annuity instead of a single payo. For
example, consider the case of  =  +2. In this case the simple 2-annuity provides an
exact compensation:
(x;y;0;0;:::)  (z;w;0;0;:::)
if and only if
(0;x;0;y;y;0;:::)  (0;z;0;w;w;0;:::):
We show that for any  there exists an annuity that provides an exact compensation.
4A related but distinct method of standard sequences that relies on continuous time was used by
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and Attema et al. (2010).
41.2 Experimental design
Our idea of using annuity compensations to measure impatience leads naturally to a
new experimental design. Though in many cases the annuity needed for exact compen-
sation will be very complicated, we do not insist on point-identifying the value of .
Instead we take a simple annuity and delay it appropriately until the agent switches
from `patient' to `impatient' choice. For instance, consider the following switch.
(1;0;2;2;0;0;0;:::)  (2;0;1;1;0;0;0;:::) (3a)
and
(1;0;0;2;2;0;0;:::)  (2;0;0;1;1;0;0;:::): (3b)
In comparison (3a), the agent makes the patient choice because the annuity compen-
sation (receiving the payo twice in a row) comes relatively soon. On the other hand,
in comparison (3b), the agent makes the impatient choice because the annuity com-
pensation is delayed. The more patient the agent, the later she switches from `patient'
to `impatient' choice.
We use a multiple price list (MPL) in which we vary the delay of the annuity. The
switch point from early to late rewards yields two-sided bounds on  as a function of .
We then use the same method to elicit the value of . The width of the bounds on
these parameters can be controlled by the length of the annuity. In our pilot study we
used the simplest 2-annuity. In Section 3.2 we derive two-sided bounds on the discount
factors  and  given the agent's switch point. In that section and in Appendix B.1 we
show how to use the individual bounds to partially identify the distribution of  and 
in the population. Our results are consistent with the recent experimental studies on
discounting, though we treat our pilot with some caution given its online nature and
lack of incentives. The partial identication methodology we develop may be useful to
experimentalists using the multiple price list paradigm, independently of the particular
preference parameters being studied.
5The key aspect of our measurement method is that it disentangles discounting (as
measured by  and ) from the EIS (as measured by u). This is because we are varying
the time horizon of rewards instead of varying the rewards themselves (we only use two
xed non-zero rewards). Thus, for any given  the switch point is independent of the
utility function u. This is important on conceptual grounds, as impatience and EIS are
separate preference parameters. By disentangling these distinct aspects of preferences
we provide a direct measurement method that focusing purely on impatience.5
This facilitates comparisons across dierent rewards. It may also be useful in light
of a recent debate about fungibility of rewards, (see, e.g., Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni
and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2013). It is often argued that observing choices
over monetary payos is not helpful in uncovering the true underlying preferences, as
those are dened on consumption, not money. Since money can be borrowed and saved,
observing choices over payo streams is informative about the shape of subjects' budget
sets, but not the shape of their indierence curves. Thus, we should expect dierent
patterns of choice between monetary and primary rewards. Because our method makes
such comparisons easier, we hope that it can be used to shed some light on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the axioms and
the representation theorems. Section 3 presents our method of experimental parame-
ter measurement, as well as the results of a pilot study. Section 4 extends our results
to semi-hyperbolic discounting. Appendix A contains proofs and additional theoret-
ical results. Appendix B contains the details of our partial identication approach.
Appendix C contains additional analyses of the data and robustness checks.
5Recent experimental work has used risk preferences as a proxy for the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. However, even though these two parameters are tied together in the standard model of
discounted expected utility, they are conceptually distinct (see, e.g., Epstein and Zin, 1989) and there
are reasons to believe they are empirically dierent, so one may not be a good proxy for the other.
62 Axiomatic Characterization
2.1 Preliminaries
Let C be the set of possible consumption levels, formally a connected and separable
topological space. The set C could be monetary payos, but also any other divisible
good, such as juice (McClure et al., 2007), eort (Augenblick et al., 2013), or level of
noise (Casari and Dragone, 2010). Let T := f0;1;2;:::g be the set of time periods.
Consumption streams are members of CT . A consumption stream x is constant if
x = (c;c;:::) for some c 2 C. For any c 2 C we slightly abuse the notation by denoting
the corresponding constant stream by c as well. For any a;b;c 2 C and x 2 CT the
streams ax;abx, and abcx denote (a;x0;x1;:::);(a;b;x0;x1;:::), and (a;b;c;x0;x1;:::)
respectively.
For any T and x;y dene xTy = (x0;x1;:::;xT;yT+1;yT+2;:::). A consumption
stream x is ultimately constant if x = xTc for some T and c 2 C. For any T let XT
denote the set of ultimately constant streams of length T. Any XT is homeomorphic to
CT+1. Consider a preference % dened on a subset F of CT that contains all ultimately
constant streams. This preference represents the choices that the decision maker makes
at the beginning of time before any payos are realized. We focus on preferences that
have a quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation over the set of streams with nite
discounted utility.
Denition. A preference % on F has a quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation
if and only if there exists a nonconstant and continuous function u : C ! R and
parameters  2 (0;1] and  2 (0;1) such that % is represented by the mapping
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt):
As mentioned before, the parameter  can be thought of as a measure of the present
bias. The parameter  represents the size of the subjective distance between periods
70 and 1. As we will see, this parameter has a clear behavioral interpretation in our
axiom system and it will become explicit in what sense  is capturing the subjective
distance between periods 0 and 1.
2.2 Axioms
Our axiomatic characterization involves two steps. First, by modifying the classic
axiomatizations of the discounted utility model, we obtain a representation of the
form:
x 7! u(x0) +
1 X
t=1

tv(xt) (4)
for some nonconstant and continuous u;v : X ! R and 0 <  < 1. Second, we impose
our main axiom to conclude that v(c) = u(c) for some  2 (0;1].
Our axiomatization of the representation (4) builds on the classic work of Koopmans
(1960, 1972), recently extended by Bleichrodt et al. (2008). The rst axiom is standard.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order). % is complete and transitive.
The second axiom, sensitivity, guarantees that preferences are sensitive to payos
in periods t = 0 and t = 1 (sensitivity to payos in subsequent periods follows from the
quasi-stationarity axiom, to be discussed later). Sensitivity is a very natural require-
ment, to be expected of any class of preferences in the environment we are studying.
Axiom 2 (Sensitivity). There exist e;c;c0 2 C and x 2 F such that cx  c0x and
ecx  ec0x.
The third axiom, initial separability, involves conditions that ensure the separabil-
ity of preferences across time. (These conditions are imposed only on the few initial
time periods, but extend beyond them as a consequence of the quasi-stationarity ax-
iom.) Time separability is a necessary consequence of any additive representation of
preferences and is not specic to quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Axiom 3 (Initial Separability). For all a;b;c;d;e;e0 2 C and all z;z0 2 F we have
8(a) abz  cdz if and only if abz0  cdz0,
(b) eabz  ecdz if and only if eabz0  ecdz0,
(c) ex  ey if and only if e0x  e0y.
The standard geometric discounting preferences satisfy a requirement of station-
arity, which says that the tradeos made at dierent points in time are resolved in
the same way. Formally, stationarity means that cx  cy if and only if x  y for
any consumption level c 2 C and streams x;y 2 F. However, as discussed in the
introduction, the requirement of stationarity is not satised by quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting preferences; in fact, it is the violation of stationarity, that is often taken to
be synonymous with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Nevertheless, quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting preferences possess strong stationarity-like properties, since the preferences
starting from period 1 onwards are geometric discounting.
Axiom 4 (Quasistationarity). For all e;c 2 C and all x;y 2 F, ecx  ecy if and only
if ex  ey.
The last three axioms, introduced by Bleichrodt et al. (2008), are used instead of
stronger innite dimensional continuity requirements. They are of technical nature, as
are all continuity-like requirements. However, constant-equivalence and tail-continuity
have simple interpretations in terms of choice behavior.
Axiom 5 (Constant-equivalence). For all x 2 F there exists c 2 C such that x  c.
Axiom 6 (Finite Continuity). For any T, the restriction of  to XT satises continuity,
i.e., for any x 2 XT the sets fy 2 XT : y  xg and fy 2 XT : y  xg are open.
Axiom 7 (Tail-continuity). For any c 2 C and any x 2 F if x  c, then there exists 
such that for all T  , xTc  c; if x  c, then there exists  such that for all T  ,
xTc  c
9Theorem 1. The preference % satises Axioms 1{7 if and only if it is represented by
(4) for some nonconstant and continuous u;v : X ! R and 0 <  < 1.
Note that the representation obtained in Theorem 1 is a generalization of the quasi-
hyperbolic model. The main two features of this representation are the intertemporal
separability of consumption and the standard stationary behavior that follows period 1
(captured by the quasi-stationarity axiom). The restriction that species representa-
tion (4) to the quasi-hyperbolic class imposes a strong relationship between the utility
functions u and v. Not only do they have to represent the same ordering over the
consumption space C, but also they must preserve the same cardinal ranking, i.e. u
and v relate to each other through a positive ane transformation u = v (the additive
constant can be omitted without loss of generality). In order to capture this restriction
behaviorally we express it in terms of the willingness to make tradeos between time
periods.
We now present three dierent ways of restricting (4) to the quasi-hyperbolic model.
It is important to observe that an axiom that requires the preference relation % to
exhibit preference pattern (1) is necessary, but not sucient to pin down the  model:
present bias may arise as an immediate consequence of dierent preference intensity|
as captured by dierences in u and v. Therefore, in the context of representation (4),
present bias could be explained without relying on the  structure. The additional
axioms that we propose, shed light on what it exactly means, in terms of consumption
behavior, to have dierent short term discount factors and a common utility index.
2.3 The Annuity Compensation Axiom
First, we present an axiom that ensures  is larger than half. We impose this require-
ment in order to be able to construct a \future compensation scheme" that exactly
osets the lengthening of the rst time period caused by . If  is less than half, then
10there will be values of  which we cannot compensate for exactly.6
Axiom 8 (  0:5). If (c;a;a;:::)  (c;b;b;:::) for some a;b;c 2 X, then
(c;b;a;a;:::) % (c;a;b;b:::):
In the context of representation (4) the long-run patience () can be easily mea-
sured. Fix two elements a;b 2 C such that a is preferred to b. Axiom 8 uncovers
the strength of patience by getting information about the following tradeo. Consider
rst a consumption stream that pays a tomorrow and b forever after. Consider now a
second consumption stream in which the order of the alternatives is reversed. An agent
that decides to postpone higher utility (by choosing b rst) reveals a certain degree of
patience. Under representation (4) the patient choice reveals a value of   :5.
Theorem 2. Suppose % is as in Theorem 1. It satises Axiom 8 if and only   0:5.
As discussed in the Introduction, our main axiom relies on the idea of increasing the
distance between future payos to compensate for the lengthening of the time horizon
caused by . For example, if  = , then the tradeo between periods 0 and 1 is the
same as the tradeo between periods 1 and 3. Similarly, if  = t, then the tradeo
between periods 0 and 1 is the same as the tradeo between periods 1 and t+2. Because
we are working in discrete time, there exist values of  such that t+1 <  < t for
some t, so that the exact compensation by one payo is not possible. However, due to
time separability, it is possible to compensate the agent by an annuity. Lemma 1 in
the Appendix shows that as long as   0:5, any value of  can be represented by a
sum of the powers of  with coecients zero or one.7 The set M is the collection of
powers with nonzero coecients; formally, let M denote a subset of f2;3;:::g  T .
6Since in most calibrations  is close to one for any reasonable length of the time period, we view
this step as innocuous.
7A similar technique was used in repeated games, see, e.g., Sorin (1986) and Fudenberg and Maskin
(1991). We thank Drew Fudenberg for these references. See also Kochov (2013), who uses results
from number theory to calibrate the discount factor in the geometric discounting model.
11We will refer to M as an annuity. Our main axiom guarantees that the annuity M is
independent of the consumption levels used to elicit the tradeos.
Axiom 9 (Annuity Compensation). There exists an annuity M such that for all
a;b;c;d;e
0
B B B
@
a if t = 0
b if t = 1
e otherwise
1
C C C
A

0
B B B
@
c if t = 0
d if t = 1
e otherwise
1
C C C
A
if and only if 0
B B B
@
a if t = 1
b if t 2 M
e otherwise
1
C C C
A

0
B B B
@
c if t = 1
d if t 2 M
e otherwise
1
C C C
A
:
The main result of our paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 3. A preference % satises Axioms 1{9 if and only if has a quasi-hyperbolic
discounting representation with   0:5. In this case,  =
P
t2M t 2.
2.4 Alternative Axioms
The annuity compensation axiom ensures that v is cardinally equivalent to u. From
the formal logic viewpoint, however, the compensation axiom involves an existential
quantier. This section complements our analysis by considering two alternate ways
of ensuring the cardinal equivalence: a form of the tradeo consistency axiom and a
form of the independence axiom.
Both axioms need to be complemented with an axiom that guarantees that  < 1.
The following axiom yields just that.
Axiom 10 (Present Bias). For any a;b;c;d;e 2 C, a  c
(e;a;b;e:::)  (e;c;d;e;:::) =) (a;b;e;:::) % (c;d;e;:::):
12This axiom says that if two distant consumption streams are indierent, one \im-
patient" (involving a bigger prize at t = 1, followed by a smaller at t = 2) and one
\patient" (involving a smaller prize at t = 1, followed by a bigger at t = 2), then
pushing both of them forward will skew the preference toward the \impatient" choice.
For both approaches, x a consumption level e 2 C (for example in the context of
monetary prizes, e could be zero dollars). For any pair of consumption levels a;b 2 C
let (a;b) denote the consumption stream (a;b;b;b;:::).
2.4.1 Tradeo Consistency Axiom
Axiom 11 (Tradeo Consistency). For any a;b;c;d;e1;e2 2 C,
If (b;e2) % (a;e1); (c;e1) % (d;e2); and (e3;a)  (e4;b); then (e3;c) % (e4;d):
and
If (e2;b) % (e1;a); (e1;c) % (e2;d); and (a;e3)  (b;e4); then (c;e3) % (d;e4):
The intuition behind the rst requirement of axiom is as follows (the second require-
ment is analogous and ensures that the time periods are being treated symmetrically).
The rst premise is that the \utility dierence" between b and a osets the utility
dierence between e1 and e2. The second premise is that the utility dierence between
e1 and e2 osets the utility dierence between d and c. These two taken together
imply that the utility dierence between b and a is bigger than the utility dierence
between d and c. Thus, if the utility dierence between e3 and e4 exactly osets the
utility dierence between b and a, it must be big enough to oset the utility dierence
between d and c.
Theorem 4. The preference % satises Axioms 1{7 and 11 if and only if there exists
a nonconstant and continuous function u : C ! R and parameters  > 0 and  2 (0;1)
13such that % is represented by the mapping
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt):
Moreover, it satises Axiom 10 if and only if   1, i.e., % has the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting representation.
2.4.2 Independence Axiom
By continuity (Axioms 6 and 7) for any a;b 2 C there exists a consumption level c
that satises (c;c)  (a;b). Let c(a;b) denote the set of such consumption levels. Note
that we are not imposing any monotonicity assumptions on preferences (the set C
could be multidimensional) and for this reason the set c(a;b) may not be a singleton.
However, since all of its members are indierent to each other, it is safe to assume in
the expressions below that c(a;b) is an arbitrarily chosen element of that set.
Axiom 12 (Independence). For any a;a0;a00;b;b0;b00 2 C if (a;b) % (a0;b0), then
(c(a;a
00);c(b;b
00)) % (c(a
0;a
00);c(b
0;b
00))
and
(c(a
00;a);c(b
00;b)) % (c(a
00;a
0);c(b
00;b
0)):
The intuition behind the rst requirement of the axiom is as follows (the second
requirement is analogous and ensures that the time periods are being treated symmet-
rically): For any (a;b);(a00;b00) the stream given by (c(a;a00);c(b;b00)) is a \subjective
mixture" of bets (a;b) and (a00;b00). The axiom requires that if one consumption stream
is preferred to another, then mixing each stream with a third stream preserves the pref-
erence.8
8We thank Simon Grant for suggesting this type of axiom. A similar approach along the lines of
Nakamura (1990) is considered in the Appendix.
14The next axiom, is a version of Savage's P3. It ensures that preferences in each
time period are ordinally the same.
Axiom 13. (Monotonicity) For any a;b;e 2 C, then
b % a () (b;e) % (a;e) and (e;b) % (e;a)
Theorem 5. The preference % satises Axioms 1{7 and 12-13 if and only if there
exists a nonconstant and continuous function u : C ! R and parameters  > 0 and
 2 (0;1) such that % is represented by the mapping
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt):
Moreover, it satises Axiom 10 if and only if   1, i.e., % has the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting representation.
2.5 Related Theoretical Literature
A large part of the theoretical literature on time preferences uses the choice domain of
dated rewards, where preferences are dened on C  T , i.e., only one payo is made.
On this domain Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) axiomatized exponential discounting.
By assuming that T = R+, i.e., that time is continuous, Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992) axiomatized a generalized model of hyperbolic discounting, where preferences are
represented by V (x;t) = (1 + t) 

u(x). Recently, Attema et al. (2010) generalized
this method and obtained an axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, among
other models.
The above results share a common problem: the domain of dated rewards is not
rich enough to enable the measurement of the levels of discount factors. Even in the
exponential discounting model the value of  can be chosen arbitrarily, as long as it
belongs to the interval (0;1), see, e.g., Theorem 2 of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982);
15see also the recent results of Noor (2011). The richer domain of consumption streams
that we employ in this paper allows us to elicit more complex tradeos between time
periods and to pin down the value of all discount factors.
The continuous time approach can be problematic for yet another reason. It relies
on extracting a sequence of time periods of equal subjective length, a so called stan-
dard sequence.9 Since the time intervals in a standard sequence are of equal subjective
length, their objective duration is unequal and has to be uncovered by eliciting indif-
ferences. In contrast, our method uses time intervals of objectively equal length and
does not rely on such elicitation.
Finally, an axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting using a dierent ap-
proach was obtained by Hayashi (2003). He studied preferences over an extended
domain that includes lotteries over consumption streams. He used the lottery mixtures
to calibrate the value of . His axiomatization and measurement rely heavily on the
assumption of expected utility, which is rejected by the bulk of experimental evidence.
Moreover, in his model the same utility function u measures both risk aversion and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution; however these two features of preferences are
conceptually unrelated (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989) and
are shown to be dierent in empirical calibrations. Another limitation of his paper is
that his axioms are not suggestive of a measurement method of the relation between
the short-run and long-discount factor.
9The standard sequence method was originally applied to eliciting subjective beliefs by Ramsey
(1926) and later by Luce and Tukey (1964). Interestingly, the similarity between beliefs and discount-
ing was already anticipated by Ramsey: \the degree of belief is like a time interval; it has no precise
meaning unless we specify how it is to be measured."
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In this section we use the idea of `annuity compensations' that underlies our axiom-
atization and provide a preference elicitation design. The method provides two sided
bounds for i and i for each subject i. Since there is a natural heterogeneity of prefer-
ences in the population we are not only interested in average values, but instead in the
whole distribution. We use these bounds to partially identify the cumulative distribu-
tion functions of i and i in the population. Our method works independently of the
utility function, so no functional form assumptions have to be made and no curvatures
have to be estimated. We rst discuss the design, and then report results of a pilot
experiment.
3.1 Design
The proposed experiment provides a direct test of stationarity; moreover, under the
assumption that agent i's preferences belong to the quasi-hyperbolic class, our exper-
imental design yields two-sided bounds on the discount factors i and i.10 The size
of the bounds depends on the choice of the annuity M. We use the simplest annuity
composed of just two consecutive payos; however, tighter measurements are possi-
ble. The individual bounds are used to partially identify the (marginal) distributions
of preference parameters i and i in the population. All the details concerning the
partial identication of the marginal distributions are provided in Appendix B.1.
As mentioned before, the experiment does not rely on any assumptions about the
curvature of the utility function ui. In fact, whether the prizes are monetary or not is
immaterial; the only assumption that the researcher has to make is that there exist two
prizes a and b, where b is more preferred than a (it doesn't matter \by how much").
As a consequence, the experimental design can be used to study how the nature of
the prize (e.g., money, eort, consumption good, addictive good) aects impatience, a
10In principle, all our axioms are testable, so that assumption could be veried as well.
17feature not shared by experiments based on varying the amount of monetary payo.
The questionnaire consists of two multiple price lists.11 In each list, every question is
a choice between two consumption plans: A (impatient choice) and B (patient choice),
see for example Figures 1 and 2. Each option in the rst list involves an immediate
payo followed by a two period annuity that pays o the same outcome in periods t
and t+1; the second list is a repetition of the rst list with all payos delayed by one
period. Under the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting the agent has only one
switch point in each list, i.e., she answers B for questions 1;:::;k and A for questions
k + 1;:::;n (where n is the total number of questions in the list).12
3.2 Parameter Bounds
Since the second list does not involve immediate payos, the observed switch point in
this list (denoted, si;2) yields bounds on the discount factor i. For example, suppose
that in the list depicted in Figure 2 subject i chose B in the rst ve questions and A
in all subsequent questions, so that si;2 = 6. Then,
iiui(1) + i
25
i ui(2) + i
26
i ui(2)  iiui(2) + i
25
i ui(1) + i
26
i ui(1)
iiui(1) + i
37
i ui(2) + i
38
i ui(2)  iiui(2) + i
37
i ui(1) + i
38
i ui(1);
where u(2) is the utility of two ice cream cones and u(1) is the utility of one cone. If
u(2) > u(1) this is equivalent to 36
i + 37
i  1  24
i + 25
i , so approximately
0:972  i  0:981:
11Multiple price lists have been used to elicit discount factors for some time now. For example,
Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) use them under the assumption of linear utility
and geometric discounting. Andreoni et al. (2013) use them under the assumption of CRRA utility.
12In fact, the switch point is unique under any time-separable model a la Ramsey (1926) with a
representation
P1
t=0 Dtu(ct), where Dt+1 < Dt, for example the generalized hyperbolic discounting
model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
18Figure 1: First price list
Therefore, the probability of the event fi j si;2 = 6g provides a lower bound for the
probability of the event fi j 0:972  i  0:981g. Appendix B.1.2 derives upper and
lower bounds for the marginal distribution of i based on the switch point si;2.
Note that if the switch points in the rst and second list are dierent, stationarity
is violated and we obtain bounds on i. For example, suppose that in the rst price list
the subject answered B in the rst three questions and A in all subsequent questions,
so that si;1 = 4. We have
ui(1) + i
6
iui(2) + i
7
iui(2)  ui(2) + i
6
iui(1) + i
7
iui(1)
ui(1) + i
12
i ui(2) + i
13
i ui(2)  ui(2) + i
12
i ui(1) + i
13
i ui(1);
19Figure 2: Second price list
or equivalently, si;1 = 4 implies
1
6
i + 7
i
 i 
1
12
i + 13
i
so using the bounds for i just derived from the second list we conclude that si;1 = 4
and si;2 = 6 imply
0:565  i  0:712:
Appendix B.1.3 derives upper and lower bounds for the marginal distribution of i
based on the switch points si;1 and si;2.
203.3 Implementation of the Pilot Experiment
To illustrate our design, we implemented a pilot study using an online platform and
hypothetical rewards. Though comparative studies show that there tends to be lit-
tle dierence between choices with hypothetical and real consequences in discounting
tasks (Johnson and Bickel, 2002) and that online markets provide good quality data
and replicate many lab studies (Horton et al., 2011), we treat our results with caution
and think of this study as a proof of concept before a thorough incentivized laboratory
or eld experiment can be implemented.13 We use two kinds of hypothetical rewards:
money and ice cream. We have a total of 1,277 participants each with a unique IP
address; 639 subjects answered the money questionnaire and 640 the ice cream ques-
tionnaire (548 participants answered both).
The experiment was conducted using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT), an online
labor market. Immediate and convenient access to a large and diverse subject pool is
usually emphasized as one of the main advantages of the online environment; see, for
example, (Mason and Suri, 2012). One of the common concerns often raised by online
experiments is that both low wages and the lack of face-to-face detailed instructions
to participants might lead to low quality answers. However, Mason and Watts (2010),
Mason and Suri (2012), and Marge et al. (2010) present evidence of little to no eect
of wage on the quality of answers, at least for some kind of tasks. In our study we
paid $5 per completed questionnaire. The average duration of each questionnaire was
5 minutes. Hence, we paid approximately $60 per hour: a signicantly larger reward
than the reservation wage of $1.38 per hour reported in Mason and Suri (2012) for
AMT workers.
The lack of face-to-face detailed instructions is often addressed by creating addi-
tional questions to verify subjects' understanding of the experiment (Paolacci et al.,
2010). In order to address these concerns, we have two questions at the beginning of
13Hypothetical rewards may oer some benets compared to real rewards because they eliminate
the need for using front-end delays so the \present moment" in the lab is indeed present.
21the questionnaire that check participants's understanding. Out of the 638 (639) partic-
ipants in the money treatment, a subsample of 502 (503) subjects was selected based
on \monotonicity" and \understanding" initial checks, see the Online Appendix.
We also perform two additional robustness checks: we study response times and we
vary worker qualications. These exercises are described in the Online Appendix.
An important consideration when using the multiple price list paradigm are multi-
ple switch points. As noted in Section 3.1, any agent with a time-separable impatient
preference has a unique switch point. 336 out of the 502 subjects in the money treat-
ment and 444 out of the 503 subjects in the ice cream treatment have unique switch
point. We focus only on those subjects, disregarding the multiple switchers.
We note that there is an important share of \never switchers" in our sample; i.e.,
subjects that always chose the patient (or impatient) prospect in both price lists. Since
never switchers are compatible with both i  1 and i  1, they directly aect the
width of our bounds for the c.d.f. of . We did not disregard never switchers, as we have
no principled way of doing so: their response times were not signicantly faster than
those of the subjects that exhibited a switch point and the fraction of such subjects
was independent of the worker qualications (for details see the Online Appendix).
In small-scale pilot tests with shorter time horizons even more subjects were never
switching, which is what prompted us to use longer time horizons.14 We are hopeful
that the number of never switchers will decrease in the lab and/or with real incentives,
which would allow for more practical time horizons.15
3.4 Results of the Experiment
As discussed in Section 3.2, for each such subject, we obtain two sided bounds on i;
and we use these bounds to partially identify the distribution of  in the population. To
14Dohmen et al.'s (2012) experiment shows that the elicited preferences can depend on the time
horizon. The dependence can be so strong that it leads to intransitives.
15However, we note that similar behavior was obtained in the lab with real incentives by Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012), where in a convex time budget task roughly 70% of responses were corner
solutions and 37% of subjects never chose interior solutions.
22represent the aggregate distribution of  in our subject population we graph two non-
decreasing functions, each corresponding to one of the ends of the interval. The true
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) must lie in between them. Figure 3 presents
the c.d.f bounds for the two treatments; the true c.d.f must lie in the gray area between
the dashed line (upper bound) and the solid line (lower bound).
We now turn to . As discussed in Section 3.2, for each subject we obtain two sided
bounds on i using his answers in the rst price list and bounds on his i obtained
above. We use the same method of aggregating these bounds as above. Figure 4
presents the c.d.f bounds for the two treatments; once again, the true c.d.f must lie
in the gray area. We reiterate, that obtaining tighter bounds on the distribution of 
is possible by using annuity compensation schemes longer than the simple two period
annuity that we adopted here for simplicity.
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Figure 3: Bounds for the cdf of 
The distribution of parameter values seems consistent with results in the literature.
The next section makes detailed comparisons. A noticeable feature of the data is
the high proportion of subjects with  > 1, i.e., displaying a `future bias.' This has
been documented by other researches as well; for example Read (2001), Gigliotti and
Sopher (2003), Scholten and Read (2006), Sayman and  Onc uler (2009), Attema et
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Figure 4: Bounds for the cdf of 
al. (2010), Cohen et al. (2011), Takeuchi (2011), Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), and
Halevy (2012).
3.5 Relation to the Experimental Literature
There is a large body of research on estimation of time preferences using laboratory
experiments. The picture that seems to emerge is that little present bias is observed
in studies using money as rewards, while it emerges strongly in studies using primary
rewards. For example, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) introduce the convex time budget
procedure to jointly estimate the parameters of the - model with CRRA utility. They
nd averages values of  between .74 and .8 and only 16.7% of their subjects exhibit
diminishing impatience. The null hypothesis of exponential discounting,  = 1, is
rejected against the one-sided alternative of future bias,  > 1. Andreoni et al. (2013)
compare the convex time budget procedure and what they call dual marginal price lists
in the context of the CRRA discounted utility model. Even though they nd substantial
dierence in curvature estimates arising from the two methodologies, they nd similar
time preference parameters. The reported estimates of yearly  are around .7. They
again nd very little evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Using risk aversion as
24proxy for the EIS Andersen et al. (2008) nd that 72% of their subjects are exponential
while 28% are hyperbolic.
Another line of work relies on a parameter-free measurement of utility. Using hypo-
thetical rewards and allowing for dierential discounting of gains and losses Abdellaoui
et al. (2010) show that generalized hyperbolic discounting ts the data better than
exponential discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where the median values of
 are close to 1. In an innovative experiment Halevy (2012) elicits dynamic choices to
study the present bias, as well as time consistency and time invariance of preferences.
Since we only focus on time zero preferences, only his results on the present bias are
relevant to us. He nds that 60% of his subjects have stationary preferences, 17%
display present bias, and 23% display future bias.
On the other hand, the present bias is strong in studies using primary rewards. For
example, McClure et al. (2007) use fruit juice and water as rewards and nd that on
average   :52. Augenblick et al. (2013) compare preference over monetary rewards
and eort. Using parametric specications for both utility functions, they show little
present bias for money, but existing present bias for eort: they nd that for money the
average   :98 but ranges between .87 and .9 for eort (depending on the task). Using
health outcomes as rewards Van der Pol and Cairns (2011) nd signicant violations
of stationarity (however, their result point in the direction of generalized hyperbolic,
rather than quasi-hyperbolic discounting).
Turning to our experiment, the results of our money treatment are consistent with
those mentioned above, i.e., the present bias is not prevalent: at least 10% of subjects
have  < 1 and at least 30% of subjects have  > 1. Our second treatment used a
primary reward|ice cream|in the hope of obtaining a dierential eect. However,
the eect is weak: at least 10% of subjects have  < 1 and at least 10% of subjects
have  > 1. This is consistent with the average  being lower for primary rewards.
A possible explanation of the weakness of the eect is that hypothetical rewards may
lead subjects to conceptualize money and ice cream similarly. A larger dierence would
25more likely be seen in a study using real incentives.
4 Semi-hyperbolic Preferences
As mentioned earlier, other models of the present bias relax stationarity beyond the
rst time period. The most general model that maintains time separability is one where
V (x0;x1;:::) =
1 X
t=0
Dtu(xt);
where 1 = D0 >D1 >> 0. For these preferences to be dened on constant con-
sumption streams the condition
P1
t=0 Dt < 1 has to be satised. We call this class
time separable preferences (TSP). An example of TSP is the generalized hyperbolic dis-
counting model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) where Dt = (1 + t) 

 and  > .
Consider the subclass of semi-hyperbolic preferences, where D1;:::;DT are unre-
stricted and for some  2 (0;1),
Dt+1
Dt =  for all t > T. This class does not impose
any restrictions on the discount factors for a nite time horizon and assumes that they
are exponential thereafter. Notice that if the time horizon is nite this implies that
semi-hyperbolic preferences coincide with TSP. We now show that with innite horizon
semi-hyperbolic preferences approximate any TSP for bounded consumption streams.
We say that a stream x = (x0;x1;:::) is bounded whenever there exist c; c 2 C such
that c - xt -  c for all t. The restriction to bounded plans may be a problem in models
where economic growth is unbounded, but seems realistic in experimental settings.
Theorem 6. For any V that belongs to the TSP class there exists a sequence V n of
semi-hyperbolic preferences such that V n(x) ! V (x) for all bounded x. Moreover, the
convergence is uniform on any set of equi-bounded consumption streams. Furthermore,
this implies that: a) if x %n y for all n suciently large, then x % y and b) if x  y
then for all n large enough x n y.
To extend our axiomatization to semi-hyperbolic preferences, Quasi-stationarity,
26Initial Separability, and Annuity Compensation need to be modied. Quasi-stationarity
needs to be relaxed to hold starting from period T. Initial Separability needs to be
be imposed for periods t = 0;1;:::T instead of just 0;1;2 (this property was implied
by Initial Separability together with Quasi-stationarity, but the latter axiom is now
weaker, so it has to be assumed directly). Annuity Compensation becomes:
Axiom 14 (Extended Annuity Compensation). For each  = 0;1;:::T there exists an
annuity M such that for all a;b;c;d;e
0
B B B
@
a if t = 
b if t =  + 1
e otherwise
1
C C C
A

0
B B B
@
c if t = 
d if t =  + 1
e otherwise
1
C C C
A
if and only if 0
B B B
@
a if t = T + 1
b if t 2 M
e otherwise
1
C C C
A

0
B B B
@
c if t = T + 1
d if t 2 M
e otherwise
1
C C C
A
:
Finally, to understand how to extend our experimental design to semi-hyperbolic
preferences, consider the following generalization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the
-- preferences, where
V (x0;x1;:::) = u(x0) + 
h
u(x1) + 
1 X
t=2

t 2u(xt)
i
:
The elicitation of  is from a multiple price list like in Figure 2, where the rst payo
is in 2 years instead of 1 year. The elicitation of  is from a multiple price list like
in Figure 2. The elicitation of  is from a multiple price list like in Figure 1. The
practicality of this approach depends on how well the semi-hyperbolic preferences ap-
proximate the observed preferences for reasonable time horizons. This is an empirical
question beyond the scope of this paper.
275 Conclusion
This paper axiomatizes the class of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and provides a mea-
surement technique to elicit the preference parameters. Both methods extend to what
we call semi-hyperbolic preferences. Both methods are applications of the same basic
idea: calibrating the discount factors using annuities. In the axiomatization we are
looking for an exact compensation, whereas in the experiment we use a multiple price
list to get two-sided bounds. The advantage of this method is that it disentangles dis-
counting from the EIS and hence facilitates comparisons of impatience across rewards.
To illustrate our experimental design we run an online pilot experiment using the -
model. We show how to partially identify the distribution of discount factors in the
population.
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28Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity of the axioms is straightforward. For suciency, we follow a sequence of
steps.
Step 1. The initial separability axiom guarantees that the sets f0;1g;f1;2g, and
f1;2;:::;g are independent. To show that for all t = 2;::: the sets ft;t + 1g are
independent x x;y;z;z0 2 F and suppose that
(z0;z1;:::;zt 1;xt;xt+1;zt+1;:::)  (z0;z1;:::;zt 1;yt;yt+1;zt+1;:::):
Apply quasi-stationarity t   1 times to obtain
(z0;xt;xt+1;zt+1;:::)  (z0;yt;yt+1;zt+1;:::):
By part (b) of initial separability, conclude that
(z0;xt;xt+1;z
0
t+1;:::)  (z0;yt;yt+1;z
0
t+1;:::):
By part (c) of initial separability, conclude that
(z
0
0;xt;xt+1;z
0
t+1;:::)  (z
0
0;yt;yt+1;z
0
t+1;:::):
Apply quasi-stationarity t   1 times to obtain
(z
0
0;z
0
1;:::;z
0
t 1;xt;xt+1;z
0
t+1;:::)  (z
0
0;z
0
1;:::;z
0
t 1;yt;yt+1;z
0
t+1;:::):
The proof of the independence of ft;t + 1;:::g for t = 2;::: is analogous.
Step 2. Show that any period t is sensitive. To see that, observe that by sensitivity
of the period t = 1 there exists x 2 F and c;c0 2 C such that
(x0;c;xt+1;xt+2;:::)  (x0;c
0;xt+1;xt+2;:::):
29By quasi-stationarity, applied t   1 times conclude that
(x0;x1;:::;xt 1;c;xt+1;xt+2;:::)  (x0;x1;:::;xt 1;c
0;xt+1;xt+2;:::):
Step 3. Additive representation on XT. Fix T  1 and x e 2 C. Weak Order, Finite
Continuity and Steps 1 and 2 imply that (By Theorem 1 of Gorman (1968), together
with Vind (1971)) the restriction of  to XT is represented by
(x0;x1;:::;xT;c;c;:::) 7!
T X
t=0
vt;T(xt) + RT(c)
for some nonconstant and continuous maps vt;T and RT from C to R. By the uniqueness
of additive representations, the above functions can be chosen to satisfy
vt;T(e) = RT(e) = 0 (5)
Step 4. Since any XT  XT+1, there are two additive representations of  on XT:
(x0;x1;:::;xT;c;c;:::) 7!
T X
t=0
vt;T(xt) + RT(c)
and
(x0;x1;:::;xT;c;c;:::) 7!
T X
t=0
vt;T+1(xt) + vT+1;T+1(xt) + RT+1(c):
By the uniqueness of additive representations and the normalization (5), the above
functions must satisfy vt;T+1(c) = T+1vt;T(c) for t = 0;1;:::;T   1 and vT+1;T+1(c) +
RT+1(c) = T+1RT(c) for some T+1 > 0. By the uniqueness of additive representations
the representations can be normalized so that T+1 = 1. Let vt denote the common
function vt;T. With this notation, we obtain
vT+1(c) + RT+1(c) = RT(c): (6)
Step 5. By quasi-stationarity, for any T  1 the two additive representations of  on
30XT:
(e;x0;x1;:::;xT 1;c;c;:::) 7! v0(e) +
T X
t=1
vt(xt 1) + RT(c)
and
(e;x0;x1;:::;xT 1;c;c;:::) 7! v0(e) +
T X
t=1
vt+1(xt 1) + RT+1(c)
represent the same preference. By the uniqueness of additive representations, and the
normalization (5), there exists T > 0 such that for all t = 1;2;:::, vt+1(c) = Tvt(c)
for all c 2 C and RT+1(c) = TRT(c). Note, that T is independent of T, since the
functions v and R are independent of T; let  denote this common value.
Step 6. Dene u := v0;v :=  1v1 and R :=  2R1. With this notation, equation (6)
is T+1v(c) + T+2R(c) = T+1R(c) for all c 2 C. Observe, that  = 1 implies that v is
a constant function, which is a contradiction; hence,  6= 1. Thus, R(c) = 1
1 v(c) for
all c 2 C. Thus, the preference on XT is represented by
(x0;x1;:::;xT;c;c;:::) 7! u(x0) +
T X
t=1

tv(xt) +
T+1
1   
v(c):
To rule out  > 1 note that since v is nonconstant, there exist a;b 2 C such that
v(a) > v(b). Then, since  + 2
1  < 0 it follows that u(a) + v(b) + 2
1 v(b) > u(a) +
v(a) + 2
1 v(a), so eb  a. However, by tail continuity there exists T such that
(eb)Ta  a, which implies that
u(a) + ( +  + 
T)v(b) +
T+1
1   
v(a) > u(a) + ( +  + 
T)v(a) +
T+1
1   
v(a):
Thus, ( +  + T)(v(b)   v(a)) > 0 which contradicts v(a) > v(b) and  > 0. Thus,
 < 1 and U(x) represents  on XT for any T.
Step 7. Fix x 2 F. By constant-equivalence, there exists c 2 C with x  c. Suppose
there exists a 2 C such that c  a. Then by tail continuity there exists  such that for
31all T  , xTa  a, which by Step 6 implies that U(xTa) > U(a). This implies that
98Tu(x0) +
T X
t=1

tv(xt) +
T+1
1   
v(a) > u(a) +
T X
t=1

tv(a) +
T+1
1   
v(a)
98T
T X
t=1


tv(xt)   
tv(a)

> [u(a)   u(x0)]
9 inf
T
T X
t=1


tv(xt)   
tv(a)

 [u(a)   u(x0)]
sup

inf
T
T X
t=1


tv(xt)   
tv(a)

 [u(a)   u(x0)];
which means that liminfT
PT
t=1 +

tv(xt) tv(a)

 [u(a) u(x0)]. Since the sequence
PT
t=1 tv(a) converges, it follows that
u(x0) + liminf
T
T X
t=1

tv(xt)  u(a) + lim
T
T X
t=1

tv(a) = U(a):
Since this is true for all a  c, by connectedness of C and continuity of u and v it
follows that
u(x0) + liminf
T
T X
t=1

tv(xt)  U(c): (7)
On the other hand, suppose that a % c for all a 2 C. Then, by constant-equivalence
for all T there exists b 2 C such that xTc  b. This implies that xTc % c. Thus,
8Tu(x0) +
T X
t=1

tv(xt) +
T+1
1   
v(c)  u(c) +
T X
t=1

tv(c) +
T+1
1   
v(c)
8T
T X
t=1

tv(xt)  
T X
t=1

tv(c)  u(c)   u(x0)
liminf
T
T X
t=1

tv(xt)  
T X
t=1

tv(c)  u(c)   u(x0)
Since the sequence
PT
t=1 tv(c) converges, equation (7) follows.
An analogous argument implies that limsupT
PT
t=0 tv(xt)  U(c), which estab-
lishes the existence of the limit of the partial sums and the representation.
32A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We have
(e;b;a;:::) % (e;a;b;:::)
i
u(e) + v(b) +
2
1   
v(a)  u(e) + v(a) +
2
1   
v(b)
i
v(b) +

1   
v(a)  v(a) +

1   
v(b)
i
[v(b)   v(a)]
1   2
1   
 0
i
1   2  0
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The following lemma is key in the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. For any  2 [0:5;1] and any  2 (0;1] there exists a sequence ftgt of
elements in f0;1g such that  =
P1
t=0 tt.
Proof. Let d0 := 0 and 0 := 0 and dene the sequences fdtg and ftg by
dt+1 :=
8
<
:
dt + t+1 if dt + t+1  
dt otherwise:
and
t+1 :=
8
<
:
1 if dt + t+1  
0 otherwise:
Since the sequence fdng is increasing and bounded from above by , it must converge;
let d := limdt. It follows that d =
P1
t=0 tt. Suppose that d < . It follows that
t = 1 for almost all t; since otherwise there would exist arbitrarily large t with t = 0,
and since t <    d for some such t that would contradict the construction of the
33sequence fdtg. Let T := maxft : t = 0g. We have d = dT 1+ T+1
1   . Since   0:5,
it follows that T  T+1
1  , so dT 1 + T  , which contradicts the construction of the
sequence fdtg.
Proof of Theorem 3
The necessity of Axioms 1{9 follows from Theorems 1 and 2 and Lemma 1. Suppose
that Axioms 1{9 hold. By Theorems 1 and 2 the preference is represented by (4) with
  0:5. Normalize u and v so that there exists ^ e 2 C with u(^ e) = v(^ e) = 0. Let M be
as in Axiom 9. Dene  :=
P
t2M t 1. Axiom 9 implies that for all a;b;c;d 2 C
u(a) + v(b) > u(c) + v(d)
if and only if
v(a) + v(b) > v(c) + v(d):
By the uniqueness of the additive representations, there exists  > 0 and 1;2 2 R
such that v(e) = u(e) + 1 and v(e) = v(e) + 2 for all e 2 C. By the above
normalization, 1 = 2 = 0. Hence, v(e) = u(e) for all e 2 C and  =
P
t2M t 2.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The necessity of Axioms 1-7 and 10 is straightforward. For Axiom 11, if (b;e2) % (a;e1),
(c;e1) % (d;e2) and (e3;a)  (e4;b), it follows that:
u(b) +

1   
u(e2)  u(a) +

1   
u(e1) (8)
u(c) +

1   
u(e1)  u(d) +

1   
u(e2) (9)
u(e3) +

1   
u(a) = u(e4) +

1   
u(b) (10)
Equations 8   9 imply u(b)   u(a)  u(d)   u(c). Suppose that the implication of
Axiom 11 does not hold, so that (e4;d)  (e3;c). Then
u(e4) +

1   
u(d) > u(e3) +

1   
u(c) (11)
34Since 0 < ;0 <  < 1, equations 10   11 imply u(d)   u(c) > u(b)   u(a). A con-
tradiction. By analogy, the second condition of Axiom 11 is also necessary. Therefore,
Axiom 11 is satised by the representation in Theorem 4.
Now, we prove suciency. From Theorem 1 it follows that % admits the represen-
tation in (4). Dene the binary relation % over the elements of C2 as follows:
(b;c) %
 (a;d)
() there exists e1;e2;e3;e4 2 C such that
(b;e2) % (a;e1) and (c;e1) % (d;e2) and (e3;a)  (e4;b) (12)
We break the proof of suciency into four steps:
Step 1: First, we argue that % admits the following additive representation:
(b;c) %
 (a;d) () u(b) + u(c)  u(a) + u(d)
Using the denition of % and the representation (4) of %, it follows that (b;c) % (a;d)
implies the existence of elements e1;e2 2 C such that:
u(a) +

1   
v(e1)  u(b) +

1   
v(e2)
and
u(d) +

1   
v(e2)  u(c) +

1   
v(e1)
Therefore u(b) + u(c)  u(a) + u(d).
Now, suppose u(b) + u(c)  u(a) + u(d). We consider the following 6 cases and we
show that Condition 12 is satised.
1. u(b)  u(a);u(c)  u(d);v(a)  v(b): Set e = e1 = e2 for any e 2 C, and
choose e3;e4 to satisfy u(e3) + 
1 v(a) = u(e4) + 
1 v(b) . Then, Condition (12)
is satised.
2. u(b)  u(a);u(c)  u(d);v(a) < v(b): Set e = e1 = e2 for any e 2 C and choose
e3;e4 to have u(e3) + 
1 v(a) = u(e4) + 
1 v(b). Again, condition 12 is satised
and (b;c) % (a;d).
353. u(b)  u(a);u(c) < u(d);v(a)  v(b): Note that u(b)   u(a)  u(d)   u(c) > 0.
Find e1;e2 to satisfy: 
1 [v(e1)   v(e2)] = u(d)   u(c) > 0. And set e = e3;e4 to
get indierence.
4. u(b)  u(a);u(c) < u(d);v(a) < v(b): Do the same as above.
5. u(b) < u(a);u(c)  u(d);v(a)  v(b): Find e1;e2 to satisfy: 
1 [v(e1)   v(e2)] =
u(b)   u(a) < 0. Note that
0 = u(b)   u(a)  

1   
[v(e1)   v(e2)]  u(d)   u(c)  

1   
[v(e1)   v(e2)]
6. u(b) < u(a);u(c)  u(d);v(a) < v(b): Do the same as above.
In any event u(b)+u(c)  u(a)+u(d) implies (b;c) % (a;d). Therefore, the preference
relation % admits an additive representation in terms of u.
Step 2: The preference relation % also admits a representation in terms of the index
v:
(b;c) %
 (a;d) () v(b) + v(c)  v(a) + v(d)
Using the denition of % and Axiom 11 it follows that:
u(e3) +

1   
v(a) = u(e4) +

1   
v(b)
and
u(e3) +

1   
v(c)  u(e4) +

1   
v(d)
which implies v(b) + v(c)  v(a) + v(d). Now, for the other direction, we proceed as
in Step 1. Suppose v(b) + v(c)  v(a) + v(d). Proceeding exactly as before, there are
elements e1;e2;e3;e4 such that (e2;b) % (e1;a), (e1;c) % (e2;d) and (a;e3)  (b;e4).
By Axiom 11, it follows that (c;e3) % (b;e4). And therefore, u(b)+u(c)  u(a)+u(d).
Therefore, (b;c) % (a;d) () v(b) + v(c)  v(a) + v(d).
Step 3: Since the preference relation % admits two dierent additive representations
it follows that the two utility indexes are related through a monotone ane transfor-
36mation. This is, there exists  > 0 and  such that for all a 2 C:
v(a) = u(a) + 
We conclude that % is represented by the mapping
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt): (13)
with  > 0.
Step 4: Take a;c 2 C such that u(a) > u(c). The existence of such an element follows
from the sensitivity axiom. Choose b;d to satisfy:
u(a) + u(b) = u(c) + u(d)
Axiom 10 implies that
u(a) + u(b)  u(c) + u(d)
The two inequalities imply   1.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Remark 1. Both Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Nakamura (1990) study Cho-
quet preferences, so their axioms have comonotonicity requirements. To have simpler
statements and to avoid introducing the concept of comonotonicity in the main text
we use stronger axioms that hold for all, not necessarily comonotone acts, but the
comonotone versions of those axioms could be used (are equivalent in the presence of
other axioms).
Proof of Theorem 5
The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. For suciency, we rely on the work of
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). Note that their axiom B1 follows from our axioms
1 and 2. Their axioms B2 and B3 follow from our axiom 13. Their axiom S1 follows
from the fact that by Theorem 1 the functions u and v are continuous. Finally their
37axiom S2 follows from our axiom 12. Thus, by their Lemma 31 there exists  2 (0;1)
and w : C ! R such that (a;b) 7! w(a)+(1 )w(b) represents %. By uniqueness of
additive representations, w is a positive ane transformation of u. Step 4 in the proof
of Theorem 5 concludes the proof.
Nakamura's axiom
An alternative to Theorem 5 is the following:
Axiom 15. (Nakamura's A6) For a;b;c;d 2 C such that b % a, d % c, d % b and
c % a:
(c(a;b);c(c;d))  (c(a;c);c(b;d))
and
(c(c;d);c(a;b))  (c(c;a);c(d;b))
Theorem 7. The preference % satises Axioms 1{7 and 13-15 if and only if there
exists a nonconstant and continuous function u : C ! R and parameters  > 0 and
 2 (0;1) such that % is represented by the mapping
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt):
Moreover, it satises Axiom 10 if and only if   1, i.e., % has the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting representation.
Proof. The necessity of Axioms 1-7, 10 and 13 is straightforward. For Axiom 15, take
a;b;c;d 2 C as in the statement of the axiom and note that:
c(a;b)  c1; u(c1) +

1   
u(c1) = u(a) +

1   
u(b) (14a)
c(c;d)  c2; u(c2) +

1   
u(c2) = u(c) +

1   
u(d) (14b)
38And also,
c(a;c)  c3; u(c3) +

1   
u(c3) = u(a) +

1   
u(c) (15a)
c(b;d)  c4; u(c4) +

1   
u(c4) = u(b) +

1   
u(d) (15b)
Therefore, using equations 14a{b
[1 + 

1   
][u(c1) +

1   
u(c2)] = u(a) +

1   
u(b) +

1   
u(c) +
 
1   

2
u(d)
(16)
and using 15a{b
[1 + 

1   
][u(c3) +

1   
u(c4)] = u(a) +

1   
u(c) +

1   
u(b) +
 
1   

2
u(d)
(17)
So, (c1;c2)  (c3;c4). The second implication of Axiom 15 follows by analogy.
For suciency of the axioms we rely on the proof of Lemma 3 (Proposition 1) in
Nakamura (1990)'s.16 The argument goes as follows. Consider the restriction of % to
elements of the form (a;b), with a;b 2 C and b % a. Denote it by %R. The proof of
Theorem 1 implies Lemma 2 (Part 1 and 2) of Nakamura (1990), with S = (s1;s2),
A = s1,   u and    
1 v. Our axioms 13 and 15 coincide exactly with A3 and
A6 in Nakamura (1990) when S = (s1;s2). Therefore, Lemma 3 implies there is a real
valued function r(x) such that:
(a;b) %R (c;d) () r(a) + (1   )r(b)  r(c) + (1   )r(d)
where r is dened (pg. 356 Nakamura (1990)) as (c)= for all c 2 C and  = 1=(1+),
with  such that  (c) = (c) + ,  > 0. Hence, it follows that for every c 2 C,

1 v(c) = u(c) + . If we set  = 1
, then we get u(c) = 
1 u(c) + . The
representation (4) becomes:
x 7! u(x0) + 
1 X
t=1

tu(xt);  > 0:
Step 4 in the proof of Theorem 5 concludes the proof.
16Nakamura's results are used explicitly by Chew and Karni (1994) and implicitly by Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2001).
39A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Suppose that V is dened by the utility function u : C ! R and the sequence 1 = D0 >
D1 >  such that
P1
t=0 Dt < 1. Let V n be a semi-hyperbolic preference dened by
the same utility function and Dn
t = Dt for t = 0;1;:::;n + 1 and Dn
t = Dn+1t n for
t > n + 1, where  = D1.
For each n dene the functions W n(x) =
Pn
t=0 Dtu(xt), Rn(x) =
P1
t=n+1 Dtu(xt),
and En(x) = Dn+1
P1
t=n+1 t n 1u(xt). Notice that V (x) = W n(x) + Rn(x) for any n
since the value of the sum is independent of n. Also, V n(x) = W n(x) + En(x) for all
n. Since the stream x is bounded, all these terms are well dened and moreover the
terms En(x) and Rn(x) converge to zero. Notice that this also implies that Dn+1 ! 0.
Suppose that there exist u <  u such that u  u(xt)   u for all t and dene M :=
maxfj uj;jujg. We have:
jV (x)   V
n(x)j = jW
n(x) + R
n(x)   W
n(x)   E
n(x)j = jR
n(x)   E
n(x)j
 jR
n(x)j + jE
n(x)j  M
 1 X
t=n+1
Dt + Dn+1
1 X
t=n+1

t n

! 0:
This also proves uniform convergence over all x within u;  u.
Finally, notice that if x %n y for n large enough, then V n(x)  V n(y) for large n, so
by the above result V (x)  V (y). Moreover, if for some  > 0 we have V (x) V (y) > 
then since V n(x) ! V (x) and V n(y) ! V (y), we have limn[V n(x)   V n(y)]  , so
x n y for n suciently large.
40Appendix B: Empirical Results
B.1 Econometric Analysis
Each agent i answers 7 questions in each of the two price lists. We summarize each
agent's set of answers by the \switch point" in each list; i.e., we report the number of
the rst question (1 to 7) in which the agent chooses the impatient prospect A. If agent
i always chooses the patient prospect B we say that the switch point has a numerical
value of 8. As noted before, under the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting the
agent has at most one switch point in each list, i.e., she answers B for questions 1;:::;k
and A for questions k + 1;:::;7.
Let (si;1;si;2) denote the switch points of agent i in price list 1 and 2, respectively.
The objective of the econometric analysis in this paper is to estimate the marginal
distributions of (i;i) in the population based on a sample of switch points for agents
i = 1;:::I. In the following subsections we argue that our experimental design allows
us to partially identify the marginal distributions of i and i.
B.1.1 Data and distributions of switch points
Our initial sample consists of two groups of subjects. The Money Group (\M") has
639 subjects that answered the \Money" questionnaire. The Ice-cream Group (\IC")
has 640 subjects that answered the \ice-cream" questionnaire. We associate subjects
with an Internet Protocol address (IP) and we verify that there is no IP repetition
inside the group. Consequently, we do not allow for a single IP address to answer the
same questionnaire more than once.
We select a subsample of 336 subjects from the M group and 444 subjects from the
IC group. The selection is based on three criteria (monotonicity, understanding, and
consistency) described in the Online Appendix. For the selected sample, we focus on
the distributions of switch points. These distributions are described in Figure 5.
Our objective is to map the joint empirical distribution of switch points in Figure
5 into estimated lower and upper bounds for the marginal distributions of i and i.
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Figure 5: Distribution of switch points in the sample
B.1.2 Marginal Distribution of i
B.1.2.1 Partial Identication
For  2 [0;1), let F() denote the measure of the set of quasi-hyperbolic agents in the
MTurk population (denoted P) with parameter i  . That is:
F() = fi 2 P j i  g
We argue now that F() is partially identied by the switch points in the second
price list. Let (j) be the value of the discount factor that makes any agent i indierent
between options A and B in question j of the second price list, j = 1:::7. Note that
(j) is dened by the equation:
iui(x)+ i
(j)
tjui(y)+ i
(j)
tj+1ui(y) = iui(y)+ i
(j)
tjui(x)+ i
(j)
tj+1ui(x);
where tj = f1;3;6;12;24;36;60g. If ui(x) > ui(y) the latter holds if and only if:
1 = 
(j)
tj + 
(j)
tj+1 (18)
which has only one real solution in [0;1). The collection of intervals
42[
(0);
(1));[
(1);
(2)):::[
(7);
(1))
is a partition of [0;1) (with (0)  0 and (8)  1).
Proposition 1. For j = 1:::7
fi 2 P j si;2  jg  F(
(j))  fi 2 P j si;2  j + 1g
Proof. Note that
fi 2 P j si;2  jg = fi 2 P j i chooses A in question jg
 fi 2 P j i
tj + i
tj+1  1 = 
(j)
tj + 
(j)
tj+1g
= fi 2 P j i  
(j)g
= F(
(j))
Likewise:
F(
(j))  fi 2 P j i < 
(j + 1)g
= fi 2 P j i
tj+1 + i
tj+1+1 < 
(j + 1)
tj+1 + 
(j + 1)
tj+1+1 = 1g
 fi 2 P j si;2  j + 1g
Corollary: For any  2 [(j);(j + 1)), j = 1;:::7
F()  fi 2 P j si;2  jg  F()  fi 2 P j si;2  j + 1g  F()
Proof. For the lower bound, the weak monotonicity of the c.d.f. implies
F()  F(
(j))
 fi 2 P j si;2  jg (by Proposition 1)
For the upper bound:
F()  fi 2 P j i < 
(j + 1)g
 fi 2 P j si;2  j + 1g
43Hence, the marginal distribution of i is partially identied by the switch points si;2.
B.1.2.2 Estimation and inference: lower and upper bounds
Our inference problem falls in the set-up considered by Imbens and Manski (2004)
and Stoye (2009): a real-valued parameter, F(), is partially identied by an interval
whose upper and lower bounds may be estimated from sample data. Given the results
in Proposition 1 and its corollary, we consider the following estimators for the lower
and upper bounds of F(). For any  2 [(j);(j + 1)]:
b F() 
1
I
I X
i=1
1fsi;2  jg
and
b F() 
1
I
I X
i=1
1fsi;2  j + 1g
= b F() +
1
I
I X
i=1
fsi;2 = j + 1g
If the preference parameters (i;i) are independent draws from the distribution ,
then the Weak Law of Large Numbers implies that:
b F()
p
! F() and b F()
p
! F()
To construct condence bands for the partially identied parameter we use Imbens
and Manski (2004)'s approach as described in Stoye (2009), pg. 1301. For each  we
consider a condence set for the parameter F((1))  F()  F((7)) of the form:
CI 
h
b F()  
cb l p
I
; b F() +
cb u p
I
i
: (19)
where
b l =

b F()(1   b F())
1=2
and b u =

b F()(1   b F())
1=2
44and c satises


c +
p
I b 
maxfb l;b ug

  ( c) = 1   ;
b  = b F()   b F() =
1
I
I X
i=1
fsi;2 = j + 1g;
Figure 6 shows the estimated upper and lower bounds and the (point wise) con-
dence sets for F(). Each of the jumps of bounds for the c.d.f. occurs at the (real)
roots of the equations
1 = 
(j)
tj + 
(j)
tj+1
where tj corresponds to the delay of the rewards in the second price list. So, based on
our experimental design the seven jumps for the bounds of the c.d.f. occur at:

(1) = 0:6180; 
(2) = 0:8192; 
(3) = 0:8987; 
(4) = 0:9460

(5) = 0:9721; 
(6) = 0:9812; 
(7) = 0:9886
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Figure 6: Bounds for F()
45B.1.3 Marginal Distribution of i
For   0, let G() denote the measure of the set of quasi-hyperbolic agents in the
MTurk population (denoted P) with parameter 0  i  . That is:
G()  fi 2 P j i  g
We now show that the switch points in the rst and second price lists allows us to
partially identify the marginal distribution G(). Let (j) be the solution to equation
(18). For j = 1;2:::7 and k = 1;2;:::7, dene:

(j;k) 
1
(j)tk + (j)tk+1;
where tk = f1;3;6;12;24;36;60g. Note that tk represents the rst future payment date
in questions A and B of price list 1. Dene:
n(j j )  max
n
n

  
(j;n)  
o
(20)
n(j j )  min
n
n
    < 
(j + 1;n)
o
(21)
Let n(0 j )  0 for all . We start by proving the following result:
Lemma 2. For j = 0;:::7,   0, let
B(j;) = fi 2 P j 0  i  ; si;2 = j + 1g:
n
i 2 P
 
si;1  n(jj);si;2 = j+1
o
 B(j;) 
n
i 2 P
 
si;1  n(jj);si;2 = j+1
o
(22)
Proof. We establish the lower bound rst. The result holds for vacuously for j = 0.
So, suppose j > 0. Note that si;2 = j +1 implies two things. First, the switch point in
the second price list did not occur at j < j + 1. Therefore,
1  
tj
i + 
tj+1
i ;
where tj corresponds to the rst future payment date in question j of price list 2. By
46denition of (j), the latter implies

(j)
tj + 
(j)
tj+1  
tj
i + 
tj+1
i ;
which implies i  (j). Second, at question j + 1 the switch occurs. Hence:

(j + 1)
tj+1 + 
(j + 1)
tj+1+1 = 1  
tj+1
i + 
tj+1+1
i :
Consequently, (j + 1)  i. We conclude that for any i such that si;2 = j + 1:
i 2 [
(j);
(j + 1)]: (23)
In addition, let k0  n(j j ). Note that for a quasi-hyperbolic agent si;1 = k implies
i 
1

tk
i + 
tk+1
i

1

tn(j j )
i + 
tn(j j )+1
i
= 
(j;n(j j )) (24)
Hence si;1  n(j j ) and s1;2 = j + 1 imply (23) and (24). Equation (20) implies
0  i  
(j;n(j j ))  
and we conclude
fi 2 P j si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1g  B(j;):
Now we establish the upper bound. Suppose i 2 B(j;). Then i belongs to
B(j;) 
n
i 2 P
   0  i   < 
(j + 1;n(j + 1 j ); s1;2 = j + 1
o
Since
i < 
(j + 1;n(j + 1 j ) =
1
(j + 1)tn(j+1 j ) + (j + 1)tn(j+1 j )+1

1

tn(j+1 j )
i + 
tn(j+1 j )+1
i
;
the switch in price list 1 occurred at most at period n(j + 1 j ). Therefore, si;1 
n(j + 1 j ).
47We use the previous Lemma to partially identify G().
Proposition 2 (Bounds for G()). For j = 0;:::7:
1.
P7
j=0 
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
 G()
2. G() 
P7
j=0 
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
Proof. First we establish the lower bound. By Lemma 2, for each j = 0;:::7:
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
 B(j;)
Therefore,
7 [
j=0
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o

7 [
j=0
B(j;)
=
7 [
j=0
n
i 2 P j 0  i  
(j;n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o

7 [
j=0
n
i 2 P j 0  i  ; si;2 = j + 1
o
=
n
i 2 P j 0  i  
o
Hence,

 
7 [
j=0
n
i 2 P
 
 si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o!

7 [
j=0

n
i 2 P j 0  i  
o
= G()
Now we establish the upper bound. From Lemma 2:
n
i 2 P j 0  i  ;si;2 = j + 1
o
is a subset of
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
48The result then follows.
B.1.3.1 Estimation and inference: lower and upper bounds
Based on Proposition 2, the estimators for the upper and lower bounds of the popula-
tion are given by:
1.
P7
j=0
1
I
PI
i=1 1
n
i 2 P
   si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
2.
P7
j=0
1
I
PI
i=1 1
n
i 2 P

  si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1
o
which can be written as:
1. b G() = 1
I
PI
i=1 1
n
i 2 P
  
S7
j=0(si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1)
o
2. b G() = 1
I
PI
i=1 1
n
i 2 P
  
S7
j=0(si;1  n(j j ); si;2 = j + 1)
o
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Figure 7: Bounds for G()
Imbens and Manski (2004)'s approach is used to build a condence set for the
parameter G():
CI 
h
b G()  
cb l p
I
; b G() +
cb u p
I
i
: (25)
49where
b l =

b G()(1   b G())
1=2
and b u =

b G()(1   b G())
1=2
and c satises


c +
p
I b 
maxfb l;b ug

  ( c) = 1   ;
b  = b G()   b G():
Figure 7 reports the estimates for the lower and upper bounds along with a 95%
condence set for the partially identied parameter G().
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